How do you judge your system's neutrality?

Cbw, the example I gave in my last post was of computer music being played back to a live audience, not someone listening to it on their own on their own system. I thought this was clear from the context, I apologize.

However, I think most people would agree that any recording of music meant to be listened to, whatever the context, is a performance; it is just not a live performance. In fact, this thread is the first time I have ever seen that concept disputed. Let me rephrase my statement as a question: if music is not performed, what is it?

Learsfool – Regarding the issue of what counts as a performance, my thoughts are similar to Cbw’s. But I must reiterate that this issue is tangential, at best, to the issue of Objectivism vs. Subjectivism. Because of that, this is one of the few times I will say that I have no dog in this fight. So, moving on...

My remaining confusion still lies in exactly what you mean by truthfulness, as you say that your transparency definition is only a part of it…

Almost. I didn’t say that transparency is a PART of truthfulness, but I did say that transparency is a KIND of truthfulness. I know that probably sounds like I am splitting hairs, but there is a genuine difference. To say that transparency is a PART of truthfulness would be to say that there is ANOTHER PART to truthfulness, in which case I would need to say what that other part is. To say that transparency is a KIND of truthfulness is to say that there are OTHER KINDS of truthfulness, which there most certainly are.

Other kinds of truthfulness exist because other kinds of representations exist, things like: verbal statements, photographs, and scientific theories, to name just a few. These are different kinds of representations. For example, a photograph is an IMAGISTIC representation, in that it RESEMBLES the thing it represents. But a verbal statement is not an imagistic representation, since it does not RESEMBLE the thing it represents. Because there are different kinds of representations, there are different kinds of truthfulness, but what they all have in common is “correspondence to reality.”

In addition to other kinds of truthfulness relating to other kinds of representations, there is also, I think, another kind of truthfulness that relates to music recordings, namely, ACCURACY, i.e. how much information about the music is preserved as it passes from the software to the ear. I mentioned this in my post on 1/18 only in passing, because my focus was truthfulness understood as transparency, not as accuracy.

My confusion lies in what you mean by truthfulness overall, then, especially with regard to 6a. Are you saying that a Subjectivist cannot evaluate the truthfulness of a recording?

I think Cbw’s answer to this is correct. That is, a Subjectivist can evaluate the truthfulness of a recording, but when he does, he is ACTING AS an Objectivist. Indeed, judging the truthfulness of a representation is WHAT IT MEANS TO BE an Objectivist.

I would disagree strongly, however, that a Subjectivist would be unable to judge how close a recording comes to the live, real event it is a representation of. In fact, this would also ultimately be a subjective judgement, I believe, despite some objectivist measures being needed.

Again, a Subjectivist who sets out to judge the truthfulness of a recording is ACTING AS AN OBJECTIVIST WHEN HE DOES SO. It was this observation that motivated the ecumenical ideas in my post on 1/18, where I tried to show that there are times when the attitude of Subjectivism is more warranted, and times when the attitude of Objectivism is more warranted.

As far as your comment that judging the truthfulness of a music recording is “ultimately a subjective judgment,” this is most certainly true, but does not have the consequence you seem to think. Judgments about the truthfulness of a music recording are subjective simply because ALL JUDGMENTS ARE BY DEFINITION SUBJECTIVE, since they are made by persons. Even scientific judgments are subjective, since they are made by persons. But it does not follow from the inherently subjective nature of judgments that TRUTH is subjective. Truth is not objective, which is why, in my post on 1/18, I wrote:

(4) The truth of a representation is its objective correspondence to reality.

The meaning behind the word “objective” here is that the truth or falsity of a representation depends only upon its correspondence to how things actually are. It does not depend upon OUR BELIEFS about how things actually are.

Another way of understanding these comments is to say:

(i) Truth is objective.
(ii) Judgments about truth are subjective.

This is the case whether we are talking about music recordings, scientific theories, or any representations whatsoever. Truth is always objective, and judgments about truth are always subjective. If you find that strange, you are not alone. The inherent objectivity of truth and the inherent subjectivity of human judgments is an irony of the universe. But the inherent subjectivity of human judgments does not mean we must abandon the idea of objective truth. It only means we must abandon the idea of CERTAINTY. Certainty is what is lost, and fallibility is what is acknowledged, when you understand (i) and (ii). If we had the mind of God, things would be different.

Bringing this back to music recordings: When we set out to judge the truthfulness of a recording, we are de facto Objectivists, because the belief in truthfulness of a recording is the belief in the OBJECTIVE correspondence of the recording to a real musical event. But since we are relying our own human minds in this activity, our judgments are invariably subjective. A consequence of these realities is that we must give up any ambition to be CERTAIN about our judgments about the truthfulness of music recordings. But that’s not all that bad.

Having said that, it is NOT a consequence of these realities that we are left with nothing to differentiate good judgments from bad ones. The acknowledgement that all judgments are subjective does not mean that all judgments are created equal. Some judgments are much more reliable than others. In other words, I do not advocate a Radical Subjectivism about human judgments, i.e., the idea that all judgments are equally valid. In my view, that is the height of postmodern absurdity. What rescues us from Radical Subjectivism is the concept of 'expertise.' In your recent posts, you cited several times your own expertise as a musician as relevant to your judgments about the truthfulness of a recording, and I quite agree with you. It is precisely your expertise that makes your judgments more reliable than those of a naive listener, which is a point I made at length in a previous post.

So, in judging the truthfulness of music recordings, we are left with judgments that are always uncertain, always fallible, and always subjective, but sometimes expert. This isn't so bad. The situation is precisely the same for scientists, and look how much they have accomplished.

Correction: Half way through my post, I wrote: "Truth is not objective, which is why, in my post on 1/18, I wrote..." It should read: "Truth is not SUBJECTIVE, which is why..."

Very informative post, Bryon! I am still unclear on my original question, though. I follow your discussion about truth being objective and human judgement subjective, and I do not find that strange. But WHY do you say that a Subjectivist is unable to judge the truthfulness of a recording without acting as an Objectivist, especially in light of the fact that human judgement is ultimately subjective? Is this because a Subjectivist would not believe that the recording could be truthful, or is there some other reason? It seems to me that even if he does not believe a recording could be truthful, that he could still judge how close it comes to it, especially since this judgement is subjective.

But WHY do you say that a Subjectivist is unable to judge the truthfulness of a recording without acting as an Objectivist, especially in light of the fact that human judgement is ultimately subjective? Is this because a Subjectivist would not believe that the recording could be truthful…?

In a word, Yes. A Subjectivist does not believe in objective truth. That is what it means to be a Subjectivist. It is important not to be misled by the ordinary definitions of 'subjective' and 'objective.' My desktop dictionary defines them as follows:

(1) subjective: based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions.
(2) objective: not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.

These are good description of the ordinary concepts of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective,’ but NOT of the philosophical concepts of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ that are the basis of Subjectivism and Objectivism. Being a Subjectivist about X does NOT mean that you are “subjective” about X, in the sense of (1) above. Being a Subjectivist about X means that you do not believe in objective truths about X. Being an Objectivist about X does NOT mean that you are “objective” about X, in the sense of (2) above. Being an Objectivist about X means that you believe in objective truths about X. So…

(1) An Objectivist about X believes in objective truths about X.
(2) A Subjectivist about X does not believe in objective truths about X.

This was precisely the nature of the disagreement throughout this thread regarding neutrality…

(1) An Objectivist about neutrality believes in objective truths about neutrality.
(2) A Subjectivist about neutrality does not believe in objective truths about neutrality.

And regarding colorations…

(1) An Objectivist about colorations believes in objective truths about colorations.
(2) A Subjectivist about colorations does not believe in objective truths about colorations.

I am an Objectivist about both neutrality and colorations. That is to say, I believe in objective truths about both neutrality and colorations. This has been my view all along. In my post on 11/07, I wrote:

I wasn't suggesting that audiophiles should be "objective." An Objectivist is not someone who is objective. An Objectivist is someone who believes that there is such a thing as truth. An Objectivist, with respect to sonic neutrality, therefore, is a person who believes that components and systems can be evaluated as to their "truthfulness." Sometimes you hear that expressed in terms of "what is on the recording." [i.e. accuracy] Other times you hear that expressed in terms of the real-world event that the recording captured. [i.e. transparency]…To put another one of my cards on the table: I am an Objectivist, in the sense above, with respect to sonic neutrality. That is to say, I believe that some components and systems reproduce recordings more truthfully than others.

I wrote this just two days after I began this thread. I mention this to point out that my views on Objectivism and Subjectivism have been constant from the beginning.

In my more recent posts, I have gone to great lengths to try to acknowledge the role and value of subjective characteristics in audio playback and music recording. In my post on 12/12, I wrote:

Acknowledging Learsfool’s objections, we make the definition of ‘coloration’ more subjective:

COLORATION: Inaccuracies audible as a non-random** sonic signature.

This is an acknowledgement that colorations are subjective in the sense that they DEPEND UPON PERSONS to be perceived. But this is still a form of Objectivism, as I pointed out in the same post:

The second advantage of these new proposals is that they bring the conflicting views of the Objectivist and the Subjectivist one step closer together. It is only a step, though, since the new definition of ‘coloration’ I am proposing is only subjective in the sense that it includes facts about the subject, facts that, I believe, are themselves largely OBJECTIVE. So this is not a retreat from Objectivism, so much as it is an acknowledgement that understanding coloration and neutrality is partly a matter of understanding HOW INACCURACIES ARE PERCEIVED.

In other words, acknowledging subjective characteristics in audio playback and music recording is fully compatible with Objectivism, since it is perfectly consistent to be AN OBJECTIVIST ABOUT SUBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS. Psychologists, for example, are objectivists about subjective characteristics. That is to say, the characteristics they study – attention, perception, memory, learning, conceptualization, etc. – are subjective characteristics, because they all depend upon persons to exist. But the attitude psychologists adopt toward those characteristics is that of Objectivism, because they believe in objective truths about those same characteristics. This is precisely my stance toward colorations. They are subjective characteristics, and yet I believe in objective truths about them.

But to say that I believe in objective truths about colorations (or neutrality) is not to say that our KNOWLEGE of them is objective. Truth is always objective, but knowledge is always subjective. I made this point in my last post, where I suggested that:

(i) Truth is objective.
(ii) Judgments about truth are subjective.

The acknowledgement, in (i), that truth is objective, means that truth is independent of persons and their characteristics. It does NOT mean that truth can be KNOWN independently of persons and their characteristics, since all knowing involves persons.

The acknowledgement, in (ii), that all judgments are subjective means that all judgments are dependent upon persons and their characteristics. It does NOT mean that all judgments are EQUALLY subjective. Some judgments are less subjective than others. Adding this to (i) and (ii) above, we get:

(i) Truth is objective.
(ii) Judgments about truth are subjective.
(iii) Some judgments about truth are less subjective than others.

The reasoning here is similar to my reasoning earlier in this thread when I argued that…

(ii) All water is contaminated.
(iii) Some water is less contaminated than others.

And…

(ii) All playback systems are colored.
(iii) Some playback systems are less colored than others.

With this same reasoning, I am now claiming that:

(ii) All judgments about truth are subjective.
(iii) Some judgments about truth are less subjective than others.

The acknowledgment, in (iii), that some judgments about truth are less subjective than others, means that some judgments are more reliable than others. In my last post, I said that the judgment of an expert listener is more reliable than that of a naive listener. The relation between expertise and the reliability of judgments about truthfulness is a point I first introduced in my post on 12/15:

…as a person develops expert perception with respect to the playback of recorded music, I believe that COLORATIONS become more audible. In fact, I would view this a one of the standards for judging the expertise of the listener.

This comment about colorations could just as easily have been about truthfulness. In other words, I could have said, “As a person develops expert perception with respect to the playback of recorded music, I believe that DEVIATIONS FROM TRUTHFULNESS become more audible.” In other words, the perception of colorations, or deviations from truthfulness, is easier for experts. That is why experts' judgments about truthfulness (or coloration, or neutrality, or accuracy, or transparency) are more reliable than those of naive listeners. And we must say that, or we become Radical Subjectivists, which in my view, is a reductio ad absurdum of Subjectivism.

Finally, the concept of ‘expertise’ brings us back to the ordinary concepts of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ stated at the beginning of this post, where I said that being an Objectivist about X does NOT mean that you are “objective” about X, in the sense of “not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.” However, there is someone for whom being “objective,” in this ordinary sense, is an important quality. That person is an expert! In other words, it is an important feature of expertise that a person tries not to be influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts. That is, of course, nothing more than a “regulatory ideal.” Even experts cannot be perfectly objective. But they can do their best, and sometimes their best is good enough.