Gavagai and mathematics. By putting ''theory of meaning''
against ''theory of reference'' Quine constructed his Gavagai
as ''unclear reference''. But the ''background'' is what kinds
of objects or entities ''the numbers are'' . Frege had no difficulty
to see them as ''objects''. But his definition was ''extension of
terms or concepts''. Aka ''any object that is extension of some
concept''. Actually ''sets'', ''properties'' and '' classes'' are
logically ''the same'' because all assume ''members''. Hence
''set theoretic'' reduction of complexity.
against ''theory of reference'' Quine constructed his Gavagai
as ''unclear reference''. But the ''background'' is what kinds
of objects or entities ''the numbers are'' . Frege had no difficulty
to see them as ''objects''. But his definition was ''extension of
terms or concepts''. Aka ''any object that is extension of some
concept''. Actually ''sets'', ''properties'' and '' classes'' are
logically ''the same'' because all assume ''members''. Hence
''set theoretic'' reduction of complexity.