Dear Henry, Some support from the philosopohy of science.
The truth and existance are not adjectives or properties of
statements. They are implicit in any indicative statement.
But we have the language part and the so called 'reality
part'. The correspondence theory is problematic because
we can't equal lingvustic part with the rality part. The
semantics threat about the relatioship between the two. By
Frege there is the distiction between 'sense'(meaning) and
'reference'. Say the particle physicist all know what
Higgs particle means. Ie its contribution to the meaning of
the theory (the standard model). But till recently nobody
was sure if Higgs particle 'exist' or, to put it otherwise
if the 'name' Higgs particle has a reference. We in Europe
spend a huge amount of money to answer this question. But
if the Higgs particle was not 'discovered' the whole theory
would be refuted. The existance is considered to be an
'ontological' question. In 'On what there is' Quine
invented the so called 'ontology detector': to know what
kind of ontology one presuposes one need to know what
values one will put in the place of the variables he uses.
Ie: 'to be is to be a value of an variable'.
Frege called statements without a referent as not belonging
to science. Those are not truth-functional statements. Ie
it make no sense to ascribe whatever properties to not
existing entities.
Regards,
The truth and existance are not adjectives or properties of
statements. They are implicit in any indicative statement.
But we have the language part and the so called 'reality
part'. The correspondence theory is problematic because
we can't equal lingvustic part with the rality part. The
semantics threat about the relatioship between the two. By
Frege there is the distiction between 'sense'(meaning) and
'reference'. Say the particle physicist all know what
Higgs particle means. Ie its contribution to the meaning of
the theory (the standard model). But till recently nobody
was sure if Higgs particle 'exist' or, to put it otherwise
if the 'name' Higgs particle has a reference. We in Europe
spend a huge amount of money to answer this question. But
if the Higgs particle was not 'discovered' the whole theory
would be refuted. The existance is considered to be an
'ontological' question. In 'On what there is' Quine
invented the so called 'ontology detector': to know what
kind of ontology one presuposes one need to know what
values one will put in the place of the variables he uses.
Ie: 'to be is to be a value of an variable'.
Frege called statements without a referent as not belonging
to science. Those are not truth-functional statements. Ie
it make no sense to ascribe whatever properties to not
existing entities.
Regards,