I posted my latest contribution before I ended my writing. There
is ''Preview'' and ''Post...'' so I obviously pressed ''Post'' instead
of ''Preview''. What I wanted to add is that ''referencial theory of
truth'' won the ''contest''. Scientist are interested in the 'real theory
of truth'' and consider the so called ''propositional attitutudes '' as
not truth funcional. So ''whishing'' ,'' hoping for'' , ''believing that'',
etc . statements don't satisfy truth criteria. They also defy
logical analysis in the sense of consistency.
I see that edgewear, say, like the referential theory but the names
which he uses are referential opaque. With Dutch he means all
Dutch but the quantifier ''all'' is not an name. It is used for universal
statemens like ''all x are Fx& Gx'' . But if one x does not satisfy
conditions F and G then the whole statement is no truth.
Then the reference to UK is not ''correct'' according to him because
Scotland is not included in UK. It is the only country where Linn
LP12 are made. So the statement Linn is made in UK is not
true? Well ''extension of names'' is difficult ''subject''. Frege's
definition of numbers was ''extension of notions'' but was
refuted by Russel because of paradoxes in the theory of sets .
More in particular by ''sets of all sets'' (grin).
is ''Preview'' and ''Post...'' so I obviously pressed ''Post'' instead
of ''Preview''. What I wanted to add is that ''referencial theory of
truth'' won the ''contest''. Scientist are interested in the 'real theory
of truth'' and consider the so called ''propositional attitutudes '' as
not truth funcional. So ''whishing'' ,'' hoping for'' , ''believing that'',
etc . statements don't satisfy truth criteria. They also defy
logical analysis in the sense of consistency.
I see that edgewear, say, like the referential theory but the names
which he uses are referential opaque. With Dutch he means all
Dutch but the quantifier ''all'' is not an name. It is used for universal
statemens like ''all x are Fx& Gx'' . But if one x does not satisfy
conditions F and G then the whole statement is no truth.
Then the reference to UK is not ''correct'' according to him because
Scotland is not included in UK. It is the only country where Linn
LP12 are made. So the statement Linn is made in UK is not
true? Well ''extension of names'' is difficult ''subject''. Frege's
definition of numbers was ''extension of notions'' but was
refuted by Russel because of paradoxes in the theory of sets .
More in particular by ''sets of all sets'' (grin).