@frogman Yes, progress indeed! You chose a great sentence: "What is wrong with the notion of objects existing “independently” of conceptual schemes is that there are no standards for the use of even the logical notions apart from conceptual choices. (Putnam 1988: 114)"
Putnam gets at the point I was trying to make. The notion that we can affix a label ("objects" or "music" or "noise") with the label "true" is one requires that we know this label is anchored in a reality outside of our conceptual schemes. This is something we cannot do; everything we label is labeled with our concepts, our words, and connect to our schemes -- and our purposes. That is why the relativist position is impossible to overturn. That said, what Putnam maintains -- and which I was trying to convey -- is that conceptual schemes can contain labels which are very, very stable, because they are part of forms of life which we have staked ourselves in. We see the most rigid examples of these labels in our logical terms ("and" "but" "or" etc.) and that is why Putnam mentions "logical notions." Hope that helps.
Putnam gets at the point I was trying to make. The notion that we can affix a label ("objects" or "music" or "noise") with the label "true" is one requires that we know this label is anchored in a reality outside of our conceptual schemes. This is something we cannot do; everything we label is labeled with our concepts, our words, and connect to our schemes -- and our purposes. That is why the relativist position is impossible to overturn. That said, what Putnam maintains -- and which I was trying to convey -- is that conceptual schemes can contain labels which are very, very stable, because they are part of forms of life which we have staked ourselves in. We see the most rigid examples of these labels in our logical terms ("and" "but" "or" etc.) and that is why Putnam mentions "logical notions." Hope that helps.