Sean: yea, I agree. Wire is over-priced. If you can make it yourself and be happy with the result why in heavans would anyone pay someone else lots of money? Makes sense to me.
Clueless: thank you for the effort of your response. Actually I agree with most everything you say. You assume a difference because you make an assumption about what I said that is, er, fundamentally misplaced. I never said that applications of method and observation don't change as symmetries of complexity in matter arrangement change. Of course they do; everyone knows that. What I said was that when applying empiric parameters to varying levels of matter complexity, those attached to scientific materialist assumptions tend to categorize those varying levels not on complexity, or an empiric application of method to that complexity, but rather, limit the categories that can even be compared in the first instance (amp vs. wire) by categorizing wire-matter as something fundamentally different; so different that wire is not "technology" or a "component" and that anybody who receognizes this bias hiding behind abstractions is being un-scientific. We see this all the time in wire vs. amp discussions. Essentially, an assumptive bias runs throughout the relation of science and empiric method and technology that says that as complexity of the rearrangement increases (tools as rearranged matter work in concert, ie. a "machine") then, that rearrangement becomes more technolog-ic, and from that assumption, that the more complex rearrangement is "better". This then cascades into the reductionist assumption that the now "lesser" complex tool is too be dispensed in the categorization (wire is no longer a "component") which allows a complete reduction in its consideration. In other words, the discussion begins with an underlying assumption that wire is not "technologic" in any way and that those arguing from the contrary vantage are somehow being less "scientific" or empirically rigorous. None of this, of course, means that matter that manifests through our rearrangement into varying "complexities" does not respond to the application of scientific empiric method in differrnt ways.
However, I will note that, psychologically speaking, many people who are attached to scientific assumptions that negate matter rearrangement (tools/technology) that are less complex, are also the same people who invariably assume that anyone citing that bias must be also saying that there are not any differences of application to varying symmetries of complexity, even though one may have never said that. In other words, if one cites the categorization bias above, then those attached to defending that bias always seem to come in and say that you are saying that all rearrangement is radically relative, when that was never said at all. That you did this may be a point of reflection...
On "Newtonian" etc., not enough space here. If you want to talk more on this, please contact me directly and I will respond. My name is Mark Bucksath. Again, thank you for your reasoned, well thought response; it was nice to see.
Clueless: thank you for the effort of your response. Actually I agree with most everything you say. You assume a difference because you make an assumption about what I said that is, er, fundamentally misplaced. I never said that applications of method and observation don't change as symmetries of complexity in matter arrangement change. Of course they do; everyone knows that. What I said was that when applying empiric parameters to varying levels of matter complexity, those attached to scientific materialist assumptions tend to categorize those varying levels not on complexity, or an empiric application of method to that complexity, but rather, limit the categories that can even be compared in the first instance (amp vs. wire) by categorizing wire-matter as something fundamentally different; so different that wire is not "technology" or a "component" and that anybody who receognizes this bias hiding behind abstractions is being un-scientific. We see this all the time in wire vs. amp discussions. Essentially, an assumptive bias runs throughout the relation of science and empiric method and technology that says that as complexity of the rearrangement increases (tools as rearranged matter work in concert, ie. a "machine") then, that rearrangement becomes more technolog-ic, and from that assumption, that the more complex rearrangement is "better". This then cascades into the reductionist assumption that the now "lesser" complex tool is too be dispensed in the categorization (wire is no longer a "component") which allows a complete reduction in its consideration. In other words, the discussion begins with an underlying assumption that wire is not "technologic" in any way and that those arguing from the contrary vantage are somehow being less "scientific" or empirically rigorous. None of this, of course, means that matter that manifests through our rearrangement into varying "complexities" does not respond to the application of scientific empiric method in differrnt ways.
However, I will note that, psychologically speaking, many people who are attached to scientific assumptions that negate matter rearrangement (tools/technology) that are less complex, are also the same people who invariably assume that anyone citing that bias must be also saying that there are not any differences of application to varying symmetries of complexity, even though one may have never said that. In other words, if one cites the categorization bias above, then those attached to defending that bias always seem to come in and say that you are saying that all rearrangement is radically relative, when that was never said at all. That you did this may be a point of reflection...
On "Newtonian" etc., not enough space here. If you want to talk more on this, please contact me directly and I will respond. My name is Mark Bucksath. Again, thank you for your reasoned, well thought response; it was nice to see.